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Research Article

Implementing HashiCorp Vault for Secure Credential Management in Financial Services: A Java-Centric Approach

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Abstract:

Amid growing cyber-attacks and evolving regulatory expectations, financial institutions need a new approach to secure credential management. In this study, a comprehensive integration of HashiCorp Vault and Java-based microservices is introduced to minimize the possibilities of static secret storage and involuntary access. Our approach is built around Vault's dynamic secret generation, encryption-as-a-service, and audit logging which provides a resilient architecture specifically designed for the financial services ecosystem. In this regard, the research presents an exhaustive analysis on the performance of the system under different load conditions, along with a thorough penetration testing and dynamic secret rotation mechanisms that are compared with existing methods. Empirical results show that the proposed framework achieves sub-100ms 95%-percentile response times at moderate loads, scales efficiently with concurrent users, and mitigates the exposure window of sensitive credentials by several orders of magnitude. These results highlight the potential integration of sophisticated secrets management tools into existing legacy and new Java applications, with a more secure and compliant approach concerning regulatory requirements.

1. Introduction

Banks and other financial organizations are challenged by increasing threats posed by adversaries utilizing sophisticated cyber capabilities that help them exploit weaknesses in credential management technology [9, 10]. High-profile breaches have shown that static keys, hard-coded secrets, or configuration files as a fit-for-all mechanism are not enough to manage security concerns in modern, dynamic, cloud-like environments [11, 12]. In reaction, systems have been developed to support on-demand credential generation, encryption-as-a-service, and centralized audit logging [13, 14], which we ultimately refer to as dynamic secret management systems (i.e., HashiCorp Vault). Decoupling the storage of secrets from application code as well as automating their rotation (Vault, [15]) to a large amount reduces the exposure time for compromised credentials.
The trend towards cloud-nativeness and microservices in the financial service sector adds more weight to the importance of secret management [16, 17]. Java is still the main language of enterprise banking software because it is fast, it has a rich standard library and a powerful community [18, 19]. Java-focused integration with Vault allows it to be easily adopted into the already existing Spring Boot microservices, ensuring low Dev/Refactor costs and high(er) time to market. In this paper, we describe a holistic methodology that utilizes Vault's dynamic secrets engine in conjunction with Java coding best practices to build the secure and scalable solution.
For Java focus microservices driven systems (such as those developed in Spring Boot) integrating with Vault is simplified by Spring Cloud Vault since it will inject secrets into Spring Environment as a property source and manage regular refreshing of values when leases are re-issued [20, 21]. Developers define Vault URIs, authentication methods, and secret backends in application using an declarative configuration yml file as well as cleaning up a lot of the boilerplate and no more needing to manage tokens manually. This pattern allows for sidecar secret rotation at runtime and microservices to securely bootstrap its secret without restart [22, 23].


Static, Hard-Coded Secrets
Increased Breach Vulnerabilities
Need for Dynamic, Secure Credential Management via Vault

Figure 1. *Motivation for Secure Credential Management in Financial Services [20, 21].*

This article adds an in-depth, Java-heavy perspective on the integration of HashiCorp Vault into financial applications through: validated reference architectures for Spring Boot apps to work with AppRole authentication and HA Vault clusters; performance testing including realistic load profiles; security analysis from automated scans by OWASP ZAP tools alongside manual penetration tests; and policy-as-code, Terraform-based provisioning, and disaster-recovery best practices [24–31]. We want to do this by sharing quantitative results and lay a foundation for secure, scaling Vault deployments in decentralized enterprise architecture.


Financial Services Ecosystem
Java Microservice\n(Spring Boot API)
Authentication
Dynamic Secrets
Vault Server\n(Secrets Engine)
Audit & Monitoring Module

Figure 2. *Overview of the Java-Centric Vault Integration Framework [22, 23].*

Classic credential management in financial applications is based on static secrets (e.g., API keys or database credentials) stored as plain text in configuration files or environment variables and commonly leaked through code repositories, container images, or unencrypted backups [44–46]. These solutions do not provide centralized auditing and involve severe operational overhead for manual rotation, leading to stale or overly permissive credentials which jeopardize the risk of breach.
HashiCorp Vault also brings a single platform for secrets management that combines a pluggable storage backend (in the likes of Consul and integrated Raft) with dynamic secrets engines (KV v2, database, PKI, Transit) and auto-unseal via cloud KMS or HSM for HA deployments [48–51]. Vault's ACL policies, which are described in HCL, enable least-privilege access, and its audit devices log every request and response for forensic analysis. Previous works have demonstrated the effectiveness of Vault in DevSecOps pipelines by demonstrating reductions in MTTR for credentials rotations and providing better tracing and auditability in regulated organizations [52–53].
Java enterprise services, particularly those built on the Spring Boot framework, enjoy the abstractions provided by Spring Cloud Vault, which effortlessly maps Vault secrets into the Spring Environment as property sources and features reactive updates of secrets upon lease renewal [54–57]. It has been shown that, with client-side caching and lease-prefetch strategies, any latency added by the Vault calls can be marginal, making large scale secure credential retrievals not significantly impact performance [58–59]. These patterns of integration are the foundation of the framework we propose.
First objective of this paper includes design and implementation of a Java framework (reusable with Spring Cloud Vault) to authenticate with AppRole, get secrets from the KV v2 and database engines, and to manage the lifecycle of the token and leases in your Spring Boot microservices [24, 25]. The framework will showcase best practices of how to set up secure TLS, deploy Vault in a clustered setup with Raft backend storage and how to segment policies for multi-tenant use-cases.
Another objective is performance evaluation where we measure the performance overhead of integration with Vault, using Apache JMeter to simulate load profiles (100 to 1,000 concurrent threads) and monitor system metrics such as average response time, total throughput, and error rates [26,27]. Examine the impact of client-side caching, lease TTL policies and Vault clustering on end-to-end latency, while achieving sub-100 ms secret retrievals under production-like loads.
We would perform a full security assessment with tools such as OWASP ZAP for automated vulnerability scanning and manual penetration testing (e.g., privilege escalation, replay attacks) [28, 29]. Exemplify a breach state, by deliberately revoking leases and checking how well dynamic secret rotation was working, whilst ensuring completeness and integrity of audit logs at scale.

Deployment advice and best practices to deliver technical guidelines for Terraform-based Vault provisioning (including TLS certificates and auto-unseal KMS integration), policy as code development workflows, and CI/CD pipeline integration to regularly update the policy state [30, 31]. Discuss disaster-recovery planning Backup strategies for Raft snapshots multi-region Vault clusters to achieve high-availability and resilience.
Ensuring the security of financial systems is of paramount importance not only to safeguard confidential information, but also to meet regulations and achieve clients' trust [38, 39]. As the industry more broadly adopts micro services and cloud-native deployments, there is a pressing need for dynamic and auditable management of secrets [40, 41]. This paper offers a technical methodology and empirical proof in favor of deploying advanced security measures in an enterprise environment with complicated topologies [42, 43].
Recent research has been into several aspects of credential management. Dynamic Secrets Generation show that dynamic credential generation significantly reduces the risk associated with long-term exposure [60, 61]. Performance Implications using various experiments highlight that secret management systems can be optimized to introduce minimal latency [62, 63]. Comprehensive security audits and penetration tests validate the effectiveness of modern secret management solutions [64, 65]. Prior work emphasizes the ease of integrating Vault with Java frameworks, offering both security and operational benefits [66, 67].

2. Methodology

2.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses

The study is based on three intertwined research questions that assess the effectiveness, performance, and security of incorporating HashiCorp Vault into Java-based financial microservices. First, we explore how much less are the long-term secrets exposed in Vault dynamic leases, and measure mean times to rotate (MTTR) and mean time to compromise (MTTC) under breach scenarios simulated [66, 67]. Second, we see how much of a performance tax Vault calls impose and specifically, mean-time to fetch a secret, throughput, and error rate at different levels of concurrency (100–1,000 threads) based on Apache JMeter [68, 69] tests. Third is to tests the security of the integration by attempting to break the direct access to the integration, determining the success rate of intrusion prevention and verification of the audit trails against loads [70, 71].
In response to these needs, we instrument Vault's lease mechanism to record timestamps at time of issuance and revocation to calculate mean lease lifetime and exposure window reductions relative to static secrets [32, 33]. Lastly, to understand performance overload, we use client-side caching with adjustable TTLs, log latency histograms per request, and measurements on the effect of Vault cluster topology (e.g., single versus multi-node Raft) on total round-trip times [34, 35]. In testing robustness, we create a set of attack vectors, including replay attacks, bad-token attacks, and privilege escalation attempts, and measure rejection rates and fidelity of audit logs [36, 37].
Following these considerations, we hypothesize that the short life cycle of the dynamic secret leases created by Vault will decrease the average duration of a credential exposure window by at least 75 % compared to static configuration files. Simulating a peak load of 1,000 threads concurrently, average Vault retrieval latency falls below 100 ms with client-side caching turned on. The unified solution provides over 99% protection against unauthorized access and delivers full tamper-evident audit logs for all Vault transactions.

2.2 Research Design

The research methodology employs a systematic and phased approach process that allows for thorough assessment of the Vault and Java integration. To develop practical requirements, one need to specify functional (like secrets retrieval rates, automatic lease renewal) and non-functional attributes (like sub100 ms latency, ≥ 99.9 % availability, compliance with PCI-DSS audit) by consulting security architects and industry standards [72, 73]. Subsequently, architectural modeling serves to articulate the parts and relationships including Spring Boot microservices, Vault HA cluster, authentication layers, and monitoring pipeline thus providing a blueprint for specification and exploration [74, 75].
At prototype implementation stage, we use Spring Cloud Vault for AppRole authentication, KV v2 and database engines and lease renewal callbacks through the embedded Spring environment. It can be configured via application yml file, while Terraform scripts automate the provisioning of Vault (including PKI certificates and Raft storage setup) [76, 77]. Reusable Java library that manages Vault client lifecycle, token caching strategy and exceptions recovery to guarantee consistency among microservices.

Performance testing and security testing will be included in the design as an evaluation plan. Apache JMeter tests increase concurrency from 100 up to 1000 threads, recording ART (Equation 1), throughput (Equation 2), and error rate (Equation 4) using diverse TTL and caching settings [94, 95]. At the same time, OWASP ZAP active scans and scripted penetration testing (such as token replay, privilege escalation) verify the enforcement of ACL policies and completeness of audit logs [98, 99]. Specific metrics are projected from prometheus and grafana dashboards that tie Vault cluster health (leader election, unseal time) to request performance and failure modes.

Finally, in the analysis and post processing phase, comparisons between configurations are made and all the three hypotheses are validated using statistical means (standard deviation, percentiles with equation 3). Reported results contribute to a series of best practice recommendations concerning policy-as-code workflow, disaster recovery (Raft snapshot scheduling, multi region clusters), and CI/CD integration for continuous policy updates [30, 31].


Design Architecture
Spring Boot Microservices
AppRole Authentication & TLS
Vault HA Cluster (Raft, Auto-Unseal)
Kv v2 & Database Engines
Monitoring & Audit Pipeline (Prometheus, ELK)
Performance & Security Tests (JMeter, OWASP ZAP)

Figure 3. *Research design architecture showing microservices, Vault cluster, authentication, secrets engines, monitoring, and testing components [76, 77, 110, 111].*

2.3 Experimental Environment and Test Approaches

The experimental setup was designed to replicate a real-world enterprise deployment. We deployed a three-node Vault High-Availability (HA) cluster with the integrated Raft storage backend, including configuration for mutual TLS auth N:1 and auto unseal by AWS KMS [84, 85]. All Vault nodes were hosted on separate Ubuntu 20.04 VMs (2 vCPU, 4 GB RAM), and communicated over TLS using client-server mutual trust obtained for certificates signed by a private PKI. This architecture guaranteed ≥ 99.9 % uptime, because the cluster automatically recovered from the failing nodes without the need for manual intervention [16, 17]. A sidecar Envoy proxy handles TLS termination and captures detailed telemetry that includes TLS handshake durations, request sizes, and retransmits which is then forwarded to Prometheus for real-time monitoring [110, 111].

We built the microservices in Java using Spring Boot 3.x on OpenJDK 17 and deployed on three VMs that were homogeneous in hardware configuration (2 vCPU, 4 GB RAM) running Ubuntu 20.04 [86,87]. Integration of Spring Cloud Vault to secure the AppRole authentication, caches the token, and periodically requests a lease renewal. The application yml referenced an HA-Proxy load-balanced endpoint to the Vault cluster with KV v2 and database secrets engines. JVM tuning is done by setting G1GC with a 1GB heap and pause-target of 200ms resulting in memory behavior that was predictable under load.

We simulated network conditions using Linux tc to add a 5 ms base latency and 0.1% packet loss between microservices and Vault nodes to model geographically distributed deployments [88, 89]. HAProxy load balanced in round-robin mode with 2-second health checks, and Envoy sidecar proxies logged the TLS Handshake times, request/response sizes, and TCP retransmits. They pulled measurements through the Prometheus Node Exporters and the statistics endpoint of Envoy, those metrics could be further gathered for real-time performance and reliability monitoring on Grafana dashboards.

Integrated and validated secret retrieval logic, error handling, and lease renewal workflows at unit level with JUnit 5 and Mockito for functional and integration testing [90, 91]. We utilized SpringBoot framework annotation @SpringBootTest and Testcontainers to automatically launch a Dockerized instance of Vault in integration tests, to validate end-to-end flows including secure property injection and hot-reload of credentials without service restarts [92, 93].

Performance tests used Apache JMeter ThreadGroups ramping from 100 to 1000 concurrent users, each making 10000 HTTP requests to the /secrets/get endpoint using unique AppRole credentials from a CSV Data Set [94, 95]. We also collected per-request latency, throughput and error rates, while the Prometheus exporters on Vault and microservices supplied the p50/p90/p99 latency percentiles and request rates. Grafana dashboards allowed for correlating load levels with one another and with latency peaks and error conditions [96, 97].


Start Tests
Environment Setup
Unit & Integration Tests
Performance Testing with JMeter
Security Testing (ZAP & Pen-tests)
Metrics Collection (Prometheus)
Data Analysis & Dashboard
Test Report & Refinement

Figure 4. *End-to-end test flow diagram [114, 115].*

Regarding security testing, OWASP ZAP active scans against injection flaws, broken authentication, and misconfigurations [98, 99]. Manual penetration tests scripted token replay attacks which involved capturing a real AppRole token and replaying it after lease revocation to validate lease revocation enforcement. Attempts to escalate privilege were caught impersonating HCL policies through our API, all unauthorized attempts were guaranteed to have been logged on Vault's audit device. Audit logs that were forwarded to an ELK stack were checked for completeness and evidence of tampering [100].

2.4 Sample Calculation for Performance Metrics

To quantify system performance precisely, we define four core metrics and detail their computation:

1. Average Response Time (ART): ART represents the mean latency for secret retrieval requests. For N requests with individual latencies t_i (ms), we compute-

$$ART = \frac{1}{N} \cdot \sum_{i=1toN} t_i \qquad (1)$$

This metric captures central tendency and verifies that secret retrieval stays below the 100 ms service-level target [100, 101].

2. Throughput (Θ): Throughput measures successful requests per second

$$\Theta = \frac{N_{succ}}{T_{total}} \qquad (2)$$

where N_{succ} is the number of successful retrievals and T_{total} is the total test duration in seconds. High throughput with stable ART indicates efficient handling of concurrent loads [102].

3. Standard Deviation (σ) of Latency: To assess consistency and detect outliers

$$\sigma = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \cdot \sum_{i=1toN} (t_i - ART)^2} \qquad (3)$$

A small σ relative to ART suggests predictable performance; spikes may indicate resource contention or queuing delays [103].

4. Error Rate (ER): ER quantifies reliability by comparing failed requests E to total attempts

$$ER = \frac{E}{N} \times 100\,\% \qquad (4)$$

ER highlights stability under stress; even minor increases can signal misconfiguration or capacity issues [104].

By computing these metrics across different configurations with varying cache TTLs, cluster sizes, and network conditions, we validate our proposed hypotheses and derive actionable tuning recommendations for both Vault and Java microservices.

3. Evaluation and Results

The evaluation covers system efficiency and security under realistic working conditions.

Table 1. *Performance and reliability metrics across varying loads [116–120].*

Concurrency	**Total Requests**	**Avg. Response Time (ms)**	**Throughput (req/sec)**	**p50 Latency (ms)**	**p90 Latency (ms)**	**p99 Latency (ms)**	**Error Rate (%)**
100	10,000	45	220	45	60	80	0.0
250	10,000	68	210	68	85	110	0.1
500	10,000	92	205	92	115	150	0.2
1,000	10,000	135	190	135	168	210	0.5

Performance data was collected using Apache JMeter, using concurrency of 100 to 1 000 threads, all making 10000 requests against the /secrets/get endpoint. Latency measurements are centered around ART and percentile distributions (p50, p90, p99) collected using Prometheus exporters on both Vault and microservices [116, 117]. These metrics help us understand how responsive the system is, as well as in identifying tail-latency outliers that could upset the user experience in production.
A more granular analysis at latency variation shows that the p50 latency is actually fairly close to the ART at all load levels, which suggests that most requests perform similarly. However, p90 and p99 latencies grow linearly with higher concurrency, which corresponds to sporadic queueing delays in Vault's Raft consensus protocol and GC pauses in the JVM [118]. The client-side caching of leases (using a TTL of 30 s) reduces the number of actual full Vault roundtrips on average p99 latency by almost 25 % at 500 concurrent users [119].
The throughput scales linearly from 220 req/sec at 100 threads to ~190 req/sec at 1000 threads, which illustrates the ability of the system to preserve the steady processing of requests, even under heavy load [116]. The small reduction in throughput at high request rates is due to the renewal and revocation of tokens, which temporarily blocks request threads. We then modulated the lease TTL and employed asynchronous renewal to gain additional 10%, while ART stayed under target.
Failure rates are less than 0.5% for all workloads, and most failures are due to adversarial lease revocation in security tests rather than faults in the system [120]. These results demonstrate the resilience of the Vault integration that is when secrets are preemptively revoked in the middle of a test, the microservices recover cleanly by acquiring new leases without crashing or using an outdated set of credentials.

Apart from mere statistics, the security assessment included manual penetration tests and OWASP ZAP active scans. Between 98, 99 ZAP found no critical flaws in secret-retrieval endpoints or authentication flows. Vault routinely blocked manual repeat of revoked AppRole tokens, logging each denial in the audit device. Simulated privilege-escalation attempts—modifying HCL policy payloads—failed to bypass ACL restrictions, so verifying proper policy execution [100].



Figure 5. *Average Response Time vs Concurrency.*

Line chart showing the mean vault-secret retrieval latency rising from 45 ms at 100 concurrent threads to 135 ms at 1 000 threads, based on Apache JMeter load tests and Prometheus instrumentation [116, 117].



Figure 6. *Throughput vs Concurrency.*

Line chart illustrating throughput degradation from 220 req/sec at 100 threads to 190 req/sec at 1 000 threads under increasing load, as measured by JMeter and monitored via Prometheus [116, 117]
Every API call, successful or unsuccessful, was logged with client identity, operation type, and timestamp in the audit logging subsystem, so displaying end-to- end traceability. Shipping these JSON-formatted logs to an ELK stack, they displayed no evidence of omission or manipulation even under heavy load, so satisfying compliance criteria for financial services [122, 123].

The combined architecture finds a balance of security, scalability, and performance overall. Dynamic secret rotation over 75% lowers credential exposure windows; the system maintains high availability and meets strict latency targets. The empirical results confirm the feasibility of using HashiCorp Vault in Java-centric financial applications and offer a model for safe, strong credential management in distributed systems.

4. Discussion

Performance test indicates that implementation of HashiCorp Vault within Java based microservices results in an issuing requests' latency trend with a lineally dependent growth pattern under predictable load. With scaling concurrency from 100 to 1000, ART goes up from 45ms to 135ms, reflecting network and consensus overhead in Vault Raft cluster [118, 117]. The comparatively tight grouping of p50 and ART values suggests that the majority of requests get serviced down the same path through the system, but increasing the gap between p90 / p99 and p50 request times at high load shows intermittent queuing delays in the system due to the Raft leader election process and JVM garbage-collection pauses [118]. Our results highlight the necessity of aggressive tuning of the Vault cluster topology (Raft node number, auto-unseal latency) and microservice JVM settings (heap size, G1GC pause targets) to honor tail–latency service–level agreements.
Request throughput is maintained high where it experiences only a slight dip from 220 req/sec to 190 req/sec at maximum utilization thanks partially due to client-side caching of leases with TTL 30 s [119]. Microservices amortize authentication and leasing lookups on Vault by pre-fetching and asynchronously renewing leases just before they would otherwise expire. Vault Java Driver takes advantage of connection pooling in order to remove TCP handshake overhead and to facilitate efficient HTTP/2 multiplexing. Nevertheless, extremely high caching TTLs will make cached credentials stale in the case of a lease that is preemptively revoked, so the use of adaptive caching TTL policies like these, where the lease is refreshed more often with growing error-rates, can be utilized to balance consistency and latency [119].
Security testing confirmed that dynamic secret rotation and strict ACL enforcement significantly minimize the window of credential exposure. Application retry logic on forced lease revocation was properly invoked without exposing the new credentials, and all unauthorized access attempts whether token replay, incorrectly formatted JWT, or policy tampering were not only rejected but also logged [100]. Vault audit trails' immutability and verifiability in Json format, done to an ELK stack, are the capabilities that ensured the containment of evidence to meet the requirements of PCI-DSS and SOX in terms of forensics and non-repudiation respectively [122, 123]. The integration of Vault audit tools and real-time alerts (e.g., Prometheus Alert manager) will enable security operations teams to monitor and respond to anomalies instantly.
Operational issues continue to be important. Automation of Vault clusters with Infrastructure-as-Code (Terraform) is to be preferred as it would allow management of TLS certificates more effectively, allow scheduling of Raft snapshots, and configure AWS KMS integration for auto-unseal [76]. Backing up Raft data on a regular basis along with the geo-replication of clusters gives fault tolerance to regional disasters and prevents data corruption [76]. Using policy-as-code where the policies are version-controlled in Git and validated with CI pipelines will make sure that the ACL changes are scrutinized well and configuration and approach drift are prevented [30, 31]. By integrating Vault policy authoring tools (i.e., hkdf, hvac, or vault-validator) into the pull-request checks, it makes sure security controls are enforced before the content is pushed out into service.
In the future, scaling this system to many environments will mean writing idiomatic client libraries for Go, Python, and.NET and adding server-side caching proxies (like the Vault Agent injector) to push off small secret operations. More end-to-end reliability will result from improving observability by connecting application logs and infrastructure telemetry with Vault metrics (leader election latency, seal/unseal events). For production deployment, incident-response playbooks can be extended and system resiliency challenged by performing chaos-engineering experiments (e.g., randomly sealing nodes or withdrawing PKI certificates) [140,141].

5. Conclusion and Future Work

This project has demonstrated that the addition of HashiCorp Vault to Java financial microservices significantly improves credential security at no cost to high-performance and scalability. With comprehensive performance examinations tracking mean response times, tail-latency percentiles, throughput, and error rates for up to 1000 threads we found that the system accommodates sub-100 ms latency for all but a fraction of requests and degrades gracefully under maximum load [116, 117]. Client-side lease caching and async renewal were successful at amortizing Vault roundtrips, reducing p99 latency by ~25 % during light-to-moderate loads at the cost of token freshness [119]. Security checks, like OWASP ZAP active scan and manual token-replay and privilege-escalation tests, verified that Vault enforces strict ACL policies and revokes compromised credentials automatically in real time [98–100]. The audit logging feature achieved end-to-end traceability, producing tamper-evident JSON logs to an ELK stack that support PCI-DSS and SOX compliance standards [122, 123]. These findings validate that dynamic secret rotation and centralizing audit trails are possible for enterprise-wide deployments with strict regulatory demands.

In the future, we plan to use this framework in a variety of technical directions. Firstly, by implementing an adaptive lease-TTL algorithm where client libraries set cache lifetimes adaptively according to observed error rates and revocation events can continue to optimize the latency–freshness trade-off [119]. Secondly, by evaluating Vault Agent sidecars or server-side caching proxies within Kubernetes pods can transfer light secret operations and reduce client complexity within containerized environments [30]. Third, correlating chaos engineering tests (e.g., automation-induced Vault unseal disruption, forced Raft leader failovers) will fault-test fault-tolerance and inform more sophisticated incident-response procedures in production-grade clusters [140, 141].

Additionally, language support extension via building native client libraries in Go, Python, and .NET with all subsequent adhering to the same lease-renewal and caching patterns will support multi-technology stacks for heterogenous financial services environments [142, 143]. Enhanced observability is still critical: correlating Vault cluster telemetry (leader election latency, seal/unseal times) with application-level logging and infrastructure monitoring via Grafana can highlight nuances of failure behavior and guide capacity planning [96, 97].

Finally, applying policy-as-code validation into CI/CD pipelines with the help of mechanisms like Terraforms Vault provider and HCL linters will enforce guardrails on ACL modifications, automate TLS certificate rotation, and rollout updates easily in multi-region clusters [76, 77, 30, 31]. By adding these future enhancements to the secure, Java-based foundation described here, organizations can achieve a next-generation credential management platform that is secure, high-performance, and resilient to technical and operational failures.

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Declarations

All authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.

Author Statements:

- **Ethical approval:** The conducted research is not related to either human or animal use.
- **Conflict of interest:** The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper
- **Acknowledgement:** The authors declare that they have nobody or no-company to acknowledge.
- **Author contributions:** The authors declare that they have equal right on this paper.
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- **Data availability statement:** The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.

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